

## Contents

---

Introduction	x1
1 What is Jurisprudence?	1
1.1 The variety of jurisprudential issues	1.2 Some basic questions
1.3 Some points of method	1.4 Jurisprudence and its substantive context
1.5 What is the value of jurisprudence?	
2 Classical Positivism: Bentham and Austin	11
2.1 Bentham's concept of jurisprudence	2.2 The command theory of law
2.2.1 The command	2.2.2 The sovereign
2.2.3 The attachment of sanctions	2.2.4 The Benthamite complete law
2.3 The viability of command theory	2.4 The question of public international law
2.5 Bentham's censorial jurisprudence	2.6 Further reading
3 Modified Positivism: H. L. A. Hart	32
3.1 Hart's gunman and the critique of command theory	3.2 The importance of rules
3.2.1 Obligation and the internal aspect of rules	3.2.2 The union of primary and secondary rules
3.2.3 The basis of the rule of recognition	3.2.4 Legal systems and the importance of officials
3.3 Hart's argument on rule scepticism	3.4 Public international law in Hart's theory
3.5 Hart and moral analyses of positive law	3.5.1 Abuse of law: the debate between Hart and Fuller
3.5.2 The enforcement of morality: Hart and Devlin	3.5.3 Hart's minimum content of natural law
3.6 The significance of Hart's theory	3.7 Further reading

Contents	Contents
<b>4 Classical Naturalism</b>	59
4.1 The central concerns of naturalist theories 4.2 The strands of classical naturalism 4.3.1 Platonic idealism and legalism 4.3.2 Plato and Aristotle 4.3.3 The teleological analysis of Aristotle 4.4 The Judaeo-Christian impact: Augustine and Aquinas 4.4.1 Christian Platonism: St Augustine of Hippo 4.4.2 Christian Aristotelianism: St Thomas Aquinas 4.5 Transition to an age of reason? 4.5.1 Hobbes: a social-contractarian response to anarchy 4.5.2 Locke: social-contractarianism and bad government 4.5.3 Rousseau: a contract with society not government 4.6 The problem of objectivity 4.7 The standing of classical naturalism 4.8 Further reading	59
<b>5 The Naturalist Revival</b>	86
5.1 Lon L. Fuller and procedural natural law 5.1.3 Procedural morality and the substance of law 5.1.4 Is procedural naturalism actually naturalist? 5.2 John Finnis and the theory of natural rights 5.2.1 Finnis's defence of naturalism 5.2.3 The tests of practical reasonableness 5.2.4 From natural law to natural rights 5.2.5 The obligation to obey in Finnis's theory 5.2.6 The importance of Finnis's theory 5.3 Beyleveld and Brownsword: the moral nature of law 5.3.2 Obligation in a moral view of law 5.3.3 The place of Beyleveld and Brownsword in modern naturalism 5.4 Islamic jurisprudence and naturalist traditions 5.4.1 The structure of Islamic jurisprudence 5.4.2 Islamic law and morality 5.4.3 Is Islamic jurisprudence naturalist? 5.5 The continuing role of naturalist jurisprudence 5.6 Further reading	86
<b>6 Marxism and Post-Marxism</b>	109
6.1 Classical Marxist theory 6.1.2 The transition from theory to practice Soviet legal theory 6.2.1 Law in Imperial Russia ordering of things 6.2.3 E. B. Pashukanis and early Marxism-Leninism 6.2.4 A. Ia. Vyshinsky and socialist legality Chinese legal theory 6.3.1 Law in the Imperial and Nationalist Chinese traditions 6.3.2 Law in the People's Republic of China 6.4 Developments in Western Marxist jurisprudence 6.5 The significance of Marxist legal analyses 6.6 Further reading	109
<b>7 Pure Theory</b>	
7.1 In what sense a 'pure' theory? 7.1.1 Pure theory and the theory of knowledge 7.1.2 The meaning of 'purity' 7.2 The hierarchy of norms 7.2.1 The structure of norms 7.2.3 The <i>Grundnorm</i> 7.2.4 The pre-revolutionary transition 7.3 Concretisation and the substance of pure theory 7.3.1 The working of concretisation 7.3.2 The reality of concretisation 7.4 The official emphasis of Kelsenian analysis 7.5 The role of international law in pure theory 7.5.1 Monism, dualism and the <i>Grundnorm</i> 7.5.2 The <i>Grundnorm</i> of public international law 7.6 The problem of objectivity 7.7 Further reading	110
<b>8 Dworkin and the Rights Thesis</b>	
Dworkin's criticism of positivism and pragmatism 8.1.2 Pragmatism 8.2 The rights thesis 8.2.1 Objections to the rights thesis 8.2.2 Entrenched rights 8.3 Judicial decisions and the rights thesis 8.3.1 The 'one right answer' thesis 8.3.2 Integrity in law 8.4 Judicial decisions and statutes 8.4.1 Settled and hard cases 8.4.2 Integrity in practice 8.5 The chess analogy 8.6 The principle of equality 8.6.1 The judge as protector of rights 8.6.2 The principle of equality and respect 8.7 Law and morality 8.7.1 Community and individual rights 8.7.2 Morality and obligation 8.8 Further reading	128
<b>9 Scandinavian Realism</b>	
9.1 Early psychological theorists: Petrażycki and Hägerström 9.1.1 Petrażycki and the theory of impulsions and word magic 9.2 Vilhelm Lundstedt and the method of social justice 9.2.1 The concept of social welfare 9.2.2 The importance of ideal imperatives 9.2.3 The significance of Lundstedt's theory 9.3 Karl Olivecrona and legislative ideal imperatives 9.3.1 Olivecrona and legislative ideal imperatives 9.3.2 Ideatum and imperantum: the binding quality of law 9.3.3 Problem of revolutions 9.3.4 Performatory imperatives and the binding quality of law 9.3.5 The value of Olivecrona's analysis 9.4 Alf Ross and the ideal imperatives 9.4.1 Validity and the chess analogy 9.4.2 Norms of competence and of validity 9.4.3 Validity and the official viewpoint 9.5 The message of Scandinavian realism 9.6 Further reading	140