

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|------------|
| ABBREVIATIONS..... | ix |
| PREFACE | xi |
| 1. INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| 1.1. <i>The establishment of a complementary international criminal court</i> | 1 |
| 1.2. <i>Possible relationships between international and national jurisdiction</i> | 4 |
| 1.3. <i>Why analyse the complementarity principle?</i> | 6 |
| 1.4. <i>The available sources of law.....</i> | 7 |
| 1.5. <i>The book's further structure</i> | 9 |
| 2. WHY AND WHERE SHOULD INTERNATIONAL CRIMES BE PROSECUTED?.. | 11 |
| 2.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 11 |
| 2.2. <i>The purposes of the Rome Statute.....</i> | 11 |
| 2.3. <i>The purposes of the complementarity principle</i> | 15 |
| 2.4. <i>Comparing national and international criminal proceedings.....</i> | 20 |
| 3. THE HISTORY OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE | 31 |
| 3.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 31 |
| 3.2. <i>The political stakes involved and the changing times.....</i> | 32 |
| 3.3. <i>Early ILC discussions (1950-88)</i> | 35 |
| 3.4. <i>The establishment of the ad hoc tribunals (1993-94)</i> | 41 |
| 3.5. <i>The ILC discussions on an international criminal court (1990-94)</i> | 44 |
| 3.6. <i>The discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee (1995).....</i> | 64 |
| 3.7. <i>The discussions in the Preparatory Committee (1996-98).</i> | 69 |
| 3.8. <i>The Rome Conference (1998).....</i> | 80 |
| 4. THE PROCEDURES OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE | 87 |
| 4.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 87 |
| 4.2. <i>The trigger mechanisms.....</i> | 89 |
| 4.3. <i>The distinction between a “situation” and a “case”.....</i> | 91 |
| 4.4. <i>The decision whether to investigate</i> | 94 |
| 4.5. <i>The decision whether to prosecute</i> | 120 |
| 4.6. <i>Article 18: Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility.....</i> | 123 |
| 4.7. <i>Article 19: Challenges to the admissibility of a case</i> | 150 |
| 4.8. <i>Two particular procedural issues.....</i> | 178 |
| 5. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 17 | 185 |
| 5.1. <i>The main rule: national proceedings prevail</i> | 185 |
| 5.2. <i>The “sufficient gravity” criterion.....</i> | 186 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| 5.3. <i>The term “complementary”</i> | 187 |
| 5.4. <i>The term “a State which has jurisdiction”</i> | 190 |
| 5.5. <i>The terms “the case”, “the person concerned” and “the same conduct”</i> | 197 |
| 5.6. <i>National inaction: automatic admissibility</i> | 199 |
| 5.7. <i>Relevant national proceedings</i> | 202 |
| 5.8. <i>General vs. specific information</i> | 212 |
| 6. “GENUINE” NATIONAL PROCEEDINGS: RELATED CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW..... | 215 |
| 6.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 215 |
| 6.2. <i>Process and not outcome</i> | 216 |
| 6.3. <i>Cultural differences and national margin</i> | 217 |
| 6.4. <i>A general standard</i> | 218 |
| 6.5. <i>Human rights standards</i> | 219 |
| 6.6. <i>The ICC’s own proceedings as a standard</i> | 229 |
| 7. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA IN THREE PARTICULAR SCENARIOS | 231 |
| 7.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 231 |
| 7.2. <i>The admissibility criteria and internationalised courts</i> | 231 |
| 7.3. <i>The admissibility criteria and Security Council referrals</i> | 236 |
| 7.4. <i>The admissibility criteria and self-referrals</i> | 246 |
| 8. UNWILLINGNESS | 251 |
| 8.1. <i>The term “unwillingness”</i> | 251 |
| 8.2. <i>The attribution of the unwillingness to the state</i> | 253 |
| 8.3. <i>The factors in article 17(2)</i> | 256 |
| 8.4. <i>Legitimate reasons not to investigate, prosecute or convict</i> | 309 |
| 9. INABILITY | 313 |
| 9.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 313 |
| 9.2. <i>The factors in article 17(3)</i> | 313 |
| 9.3. <i>General or specific causes of a state’s “inability”</i> | 328 |
| 10. POSSIBLE LACUNAS IN THE ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA | 331 |
| 10.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 331 |
| 10.2. <i>Completed trials and inability</i> | 331 |
| 10.3. <i>The accused has abused the national process</i> | 332 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| 10.4. <i>New significant evidence after a completed proceeding</i> | 333 |
| 10.5. <i>The convicted person is subsequently pardoned or paroled</i> | 334 |
| 10.6. <i>The state has characterised an ICC crime as an ordinary crime</i> | 335 |
| 10.7. <i>The case has implications for other cases before the ICC</i> | 337 |
| 11. THE PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION | 339 |
| 11.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 339 |
| 11.2. <i>Some general aspects</i> | 340 |
| 11.3. <i>Prosecutorial discretion before other international and national jurisdictions</i> | 346 |
| 11.4. <i>The “interests of justice” criterion in article 53 – general analysis</i> | 353 |
| 11.5. <i>Factors listed in article 53</i> | 359 |
| 11.6. <i>Factors not listed in article 53</i> | 372 |
| 11.7. <i>Judicial control</i> | 403 |
| 11.8. <i>The need for a prosecutorial policy, transparency and guidelines</i> | 410 |
| 12. COMPLEMENTARITY AND ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL MECHANISMS | 417 |
| 12.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 417 |
| 12.2. <i>The transitional government’s dilemma</i> | 420 |
| 12.3. <i>National amnesties and other states</i> | 423 |
| 12.4. <i>National amnesties and the Rome Statute</i> | 424 |
| 12.5. <i>Suggested factors for the “evaluation” of national amnesties</i> | 451 |
| 12.6. <i>Conclusive remarks</i> | 463 |
| 13. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS | 469 |
| 13.1. <i>Introduction</i> | 469 |
| 13.2. <i>Safeguarding state sovereignty</i> | 469 |
| 13.3. <i>Promoting national criminal proceedings</i> | 473 |
| 13.4. <i>Ensuring effective ICC interference</i> | 478 |
| 13.5. <i>Ensuring an appropriate selection of situations and cases</i> | 483 |
| 13.6. <i>Would a primary ICC have been preferable?</i> | 486 |
| INDEX | 489 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 499 |
| SELECTED DOCUMENTS | 515 |
| TABLE OF CASES | 525 |